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Venture capitalistsAbstract In an effort to better understand the effects of venture capital
investment on selected firm governance and financing structures, we examined
the post-IPO experiences of 190 biotechnology and healthcare firms (see appendix).
Our study revealed that in virtually all cases, the involvement of venture capitalists
reduced the role of the founder-entrepreneur in strategic decision making. This was
illustrated by the larger proportion of outside directors when venture capitalists
invested and the smaller proportion of entrepreneurs who remained officers or in
board positions after the IPO. We also found that venture capitalists rarely invested
alone, and preferred to structure deals in which venture capital partners share both
risks and rewards.
D 2005 Kelley School of Business, Indiana University. All rights reserved.1. Pressures to go public
For the past decade, the business press, implicitly
or explicitly, has promoted the view that creating a
publicly traded company should be the goal of
entrepreneurs. From this perspective, the entre-
preneur and firm are not truly successful until they
have undertaken an initial public offering (IPO).
However, there are more practical reasons for the5 Kelley School of Business, In
e.edu(D.R.Williams)8
r@uab.edu(P.M.Ginter).entrepreneur to contemplate an IPO. For firms
involved in areas such as pharmaceuticals and
biotechnology, the capital requirements to bring a
product from conception to market are so great
that they preclude financial boot-strapping meth-
ods applicable to other industries. Moreover, it is
often difficult for firms to attract professional and
managerial talent without offering some form of
equity, typically stock options that are tied to
publicly traded stock.
The access to capital facilitated by going public
does not come without consequences, however.
Intense scrutiny by the Securities and Exchange
Commission and other regulators may distract,Business Horizons (2006) 49, 303—311diana University. All rights reserved.
D.R. Williams et al.304deter, or alter the actions of entrepreneurs not
familiar with the IPO process or not experienced
at operating publicly traded companies. Addition-
ally, some new ventures receive interim financing
from venture capitalists, angel investors, and
others that requires them to create publicly
traded stock. Often, interim investors have defin-
itive timelines regarding when they expect to
receive a minimum return and/or a refund on
their investments. Interim financing may initially
postpone the need to go public. Nevertheless, the
IPO has increasingly become the exit strategy for
interim investors; thus, their involvement may
hasten the inevitability of an IPO for the new
venture.
Frequently, entrepreneurs and venture capital-
ists have divergent goals. Bhide (1996, p. 122)
noted that an individual entrepreneur’s personal
and business goals are binextricably linked,Q and
that entrepreneurs must answer personal questions
before they can answer questions related to their
business. These questions include: bWhat kind of
business do I wish to build?Q, bWhat are the risks and
sacrifices of building such a business?Q and bCan I
accept these risks and sacrifices?Q.
We are interested in how much control the
typical entrepreneur is willing to relinquish in order
to bring their concept, product, or service to
market, despite potentially differing goals with
interim investors. Specifically, we are interested in
the impact venture capitalists have on governance-
related issues and financing structures of new
ventures at the time of the IPO. Understanding
the impact of venture capital involvement may
assist the entrepreneur in strategic decision making
regarding the goals and financing of their organi-
zation. Though beyond the scope of our data, we
speculate that, based on their goals, venture
capitalists may attract certain types of entrepre-
neurs, but not others.
1.1. Options for and types of entrepreneurs
From the moment entrepreneurs recognize their
ideas have market potential, they face the chal-
lenge of how best to finance their ventures. For a
few firms, such as Genentech, the business and
financial strategy may be laid out and agreed upon
by the entrepreneur and interim investors at the
firm’s conception. However, for many firms this is
not the case, with the entrepreneur seeking
financial and strategic advice on an bas-neededQ
basis. The impetus to raise additional funds may
force entrepreneurs to obtain additional financing
beyond their personal means and that which might
be obtained from angel investors. This decision canarise from the need of the firm (to survive and
grow) or the need of the entrepreneur (desire to
diversify their personal risk or the reluctance to
make additional investments).
Entrepreneurs have traditionally relied upon
multiple sources of external financing: debt,
private equity, venture capital, and public stock
offerings. Investors who commit funds to business
start-ups expect to receive back their invested
funds, along with a handsome return. This view
of the IPO, however, may or may not coincide
with that of the initial entrepreneur. Examining
serial entrepreneurs, Wright, Robbie, and Ennew
(1997) note that entrepreneurs are frequently
either craftsmen or opportunists. While craftsmen
are motivated by a desire for autonomy, oppor-
tunists are motivated by a desire for financial
gain.
Some entrepreneurs view the IPO exactly as do
interim investors; i.e., as an exit strategy (an
opportunity to transfer ownership and control to
other parties). Many serial entrepreneurs fit into
this mold. They start a new venture but do not wish
to see it to fruition; their motivation is driven by
their love of the venture creation process. At the
other extreme, some entrepreneurs view going
public as a last resort: a means to raise funds when
other options are not available. For these individ-
uals, remaining private may be of the utmost
importance, but pragmatically impossible. Most
entrepreneurs, however, consider the IPO as a
vehicle to fund the company beyond their own
and interim investors’ means, while reducing both
parties’ financial risk.
Entrepreneurs must ask themselves if their goals
and needs are congruent with those of potential
investors. For the entrepreneur of a fledgling
company, goal congruency may be as important as
receiving the funding itself. For the founding
entrepreneur whose goal is to run their own
company, some financial arrangements may not
be worth the cost of loss of control.
1.2. Venture capital arrangement
Developing a model of venture capital investment,
Tyebjee and Bruno (1984, p. 1054) note that once
the deal between entrepreneurs and venture
capitalists has been consummated, the brole of
the venture capitalist expands from investor to
collaborator.Q At this stage, value is added by the
venture capitalist, thereby justifying the manage-
ment fees and a percentage of the profits (Davila,
Foster, & Gupta, 2003; Sapienza, 1992).
According to the National Venture Capital Asso-
ciation (www.ncva.org), venture capital firms were
Structuring deals and governance after the IPO 305customarily organized as limited partnerships, with
limited liability companies (LLCs) or limited liabil-
ity partnerships (LLPs) becoming more common.
These entities typically have predefined life spans
(Gompers, 1996) and are, unlike mutual funds,
illiquid. Fig. 1 illustrates the structure of a typical
venture capital general partnership.
As depicted in Fig. 1, there are several con-
tractual and monetary relationships. Each entity
(e.g., management company and new venture) has
its own set of articles of incorporation and bylaws.
The venture capital firm is represented as the
Management Company and acts as the general
partner. Each venture capital firm may set up
multiple LLPs to invest in numerous new ventures.
The investment typically involves an equity posi-
tion in the new venture. Barry, Muscarella, Peavy,
and Vetsuypens (1990) found that, on average,
venture capital firms own 34.3% of the pre-initial
public offering equity of the firms in which they
invest.
Looking at project governance, Sahlman (1990)
illustrated that the venture capital firm typically
invests very little (usually 1%) in the LLP; rather,
the majority of funds come from investors as
limited partners. The General Partner has a ma-
nagement agreement with the LLP. Most often,
there is a board of directors composed of lim-
ited partners and representatives from the
general partnership. The management agreement
between the LLP and the General Partner

























Figure 1 The venture capital arrangement. Source: Adapt
1994), and Schilit (1994).2.5% of committed capital, for management
services.
There is also an agreement between the LLP
and the new venture, with some arrangements
allowing for board participation by LLP members.
Investment in the new venture is usually staged.
According to Sahlman (1990) and Schilit (1994),
the LLP seeks a high return on its investment,
typically about 20—30% of the new venture’s
profits. These funds are then distributed to the
limited and general partners based upon prede-
fined rights. If the new venture goes public, the
shares or cash can be distributed to the partners
in accordance with the ownership interest of the
partners.
A substantial portion of the venture capitalist’s
time and energy is consumed by the creation and
monitoring of arrangements. The venture capital-
ist’s success in carrying out duties dictates whether
the organization will attract additional investors or
limited partners. Barry et al. (1990) found that 85%
of venture capitalists participate in governance of
the new ventures, with a significant proportion
having more than one seat on the board of
directors. Board participation can act as a signal
to investors with respect to the monitoring that has
occurred by the venture capitalists. Sapienza,
Manigart, and Vermeir (1996) found that venture
capitalists view strategic involvement as their most
important role, and that boards with venture
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In an effort to better understand the effects of
venture capital investment on selected firm gover-
nance and financing structures, we examined the
post-IPO experiences of 190 biotechnology and
healthcare firms (see appendix). Specifically, we
wanted to answer three important questions about
venture capital involvement in firms engaged in
initial public offerings. These questions and their
answers affect entrepreneurs differently based on
their goals. The questions we considered were:
(1) How does venture capital investment affect the
composition of the board of directors in firms
engaged in an initial public offering?
(2) What happens to the entrepreneur when ven-
ture capitalists invest?
(3) How do venture capitalists invest in initial
public offerings?2.1. How does venture capital investment
affect the composition of the board of
directors?
In studying board composition, Ranft and O’Neill
(2001) suggested that founding CEOs and their
growing firms can maintain an entrepreneurial
spirit by adopting strong independent boards.
However, in studying governance and perfor-
mance, Daily and Dalton (1992) found only modest
performance advantages for entrepreneurial firms
with greater proportions of outside directors. Of
the 190 start-up firms we studied, 69% of their
board of director members were outsiders (see
Table 1). A slightly higher percentage of outsiders
were found in biotechnology firms (72%) than
healthcare firms (66%). Of the 102 IPOs with
venture capital investment, 75% of the board
seats were held by outsiders. The percentage of
outside directors for biotechnology firms was 77%,
for healthcare firms, 74%. When venture capital-Table 1 Percent of directors in biotechnology and health
Tota
Number 190
Percent of outside directors 69%
IPOs with venture capital investment 102
Percent of outside directors in IPOs with
venture capital investment
75%
IPOs without venture capital investment 88
Percent of outside directors in IPOs without
venture capital investment
61%
IPOs with venture capital investment with
venture capitalists on board of directors
92%ists were not involved, these percentages dropped
to 61%, 64%, and 59%, respectively. In almost all
cases (92% of the IPOs) when venture capitalists
became involved through direct investment, they
occupied one or more seats on the board of
directors.
The answer to our first question is clear: when
venture capitalists are involved in biotechnology
and healthcare IPOs, the percentage of outsiders on
the firm’s board of directors will increase by as
much as 15 percentage points. If one assumes that
the typical board of directors of a start-up firm has
six members, the presence of venture capital
investment will result in approximately one addi-
tional board seat being allocated to an outsider.
Moreover, this additional seat is likely to be
occupied by a venture capitalist, as evidenced by
the fact that more than 90% of the companies in our
sample with venture capital involvement had a
venture capitalist on the board. The involvement of
venture capitalists in direct investment creates the
potential for significant impact by outsiders on the
firm’s strategic decision making.
2.2. What happens to entrepreneurs when
venture capitalists invest?
Although Willard, Krueger, and Feeser (1992)
found no differences in performance between
founder-managed and professionally managed high
growth firms, Boeker and Karichalil (2002) argue
that rapidly growing new firms quickly eclipse the
managerial capacity of entrepreneurs or founders.
Table 2 illustrates that 78% of the 190 IPOs we
studied retained the founder as either an officer
or a member of the board of directors. Of the 102
IPOs with venture capital involvement, 79% kept
the founder as an officer or board member. This
number was only slightly higher than the 77% of
the IPOs without venture capital investment.
Founders remained as either an officer or a



















Number 190 41 59 54 46
IPOs with founder as an
officer or board member
78% 78 79 79 77
Biotechnology 75 84
Healthcare 84 74
IPOs with founder as chair of BOD 54% 47 59 51 58
Biotechnology 43 55
Healthcare 58 60
IPOs with founder as CEO 55% 53 57 53 58
Biotechnology 45 65
Healthcare 60 54
IPOs with founder as CEO
and chair of BOD
36% 31 39 30 42
Biotechnology 26 39
Healthcare 35 44





Structuring deals and governance after the IPO 307compared to 79% in healthcare firms. When venture
capitalists were involved, the percentage of bio-
technology firms placing the founder in an officer
or board position dropped to 75%, compared to 84%
when venture capitalists were not investors. In the
case of healthcare firms, the percent of founders as
an officer or board member actually increased to
84% when venture capitalists invested, and dropped
to 74% when this involvement was not present. Only
in biotechnology did there appear to be a signifi-
cant reduction in the percent of founders in officer
and director positions when venture capitalists
were involved. In fact, just the opposite occurred
in healthcare, with founders retaining positions as
officers and directors in significantly more cases
than in biotechnology.
The founder served as the chairperson of the
board in 54% of the total IPOs studied. This number
was smaller in biotechnology firms (47%) and larger
in healthcare firms (59%). When venture capitalists
signed on as investors, a slightly smaller percentage
(51%) of IPOs maintained the founder as chairper-
son compared to IPOs without venture capital
investment (58%). When venture capitalists
invested, 43% of the biotechnology firm founders
served as COB, compared to 58% in healthcare.
When venture capitalists were not involved, 55% of
the founders of biotechnology firms served as COB,
while in healthcare this number was 60%. It is
important to note that, in all cases, the founding
entrepreneurs served as chair of the board more
commonly in both segments when venture capital-
ists were not investors.In the total sample, 55% of the founders
remained as CEO after the IPO. In biotechnology
firms, 53% served as CEO, while the percentage was
slightly higher for healthcare firms, at 57%. In firms
where venture capitalists were involved, 53% of the
founders served as CEOs, compared to 58% where
venture capitalists were not involved. In biotech-
nology firms, 45% of the founders served as CEO
when venture capitalists invested, compared to
65% when venture capitalists were not involved. In
healthcare, the numbers were 60% and 54%,
respectively. Overall, a pattern emerged that when
venture capitalists were involved, fewer founders
served as CEO. An interesting exception to this,
however, was noted in the area of healthcare. A
substantially larger number of founders served as
CEOs when venture capitalists invested in health-
care firms than when venture capitalists were not
active investors.
Thirty-six percent of the total sample had
founders serving as both CEO and COB (known as
duality) after completion of the IPO. This occurred
more often in healthcare (39%) than in biotechnol-
ogy (31%). Firms retained the founder as CEO and
COB 30% of the time when venture capitalists
invested in the IPO, compared to 42% when venture
capitalists were not involved. This dynamic was
consistent in both biotechnology and healthcare,
with 32% compared to 58% in biotechnology and 46%
compared to 61% in healthcare. When disregarding
the status of the founder, duality was much more
likely without venture capital involvement (60%)
than with it (39%). These figures differ considerably
Table 3 Number of venture capital firms invested in










S.D. 1.6 1.6 1.6
Range 1—7 1—6 1—7
D.R. Williams et al.308from large corporations overall in that, as Boyd
(1995) noted, over 80% of Fortune 500 companies
have CEOs who are also chairs of the board. In both
biotechnology and healthcare, founders occupied
higher leadership positions when venture capital-
ists were not investors.
2.3. How do venture capitalists invest in
IPOs?
When venture capitalists invest in private organ-
izations that are newly formed or forming, they
often view themselves as bentrepreneurs first,
financiers secondQ (www.ncva.org). Examining IPO
underpricing, Daily, Certo, Dalton, and Roengpitya
(2003) observed that venture capital involvement
often signals a positive performance potential for
the IPO. When investing in IPOs, three practices
are common for venture capitalists: co-investing,
staged financing, and specialization (Steier &
Greenwood, 1995). Norton (1995, p. 24) suggested
looking at alternative means to allocate capital
that b[s]everal venture capitalists may compete to
invest in an especially attractive-looking entrepre-
neurial team.Q Moreover, venture capitalist firms
may find a venture more attractive if they can
share expertise as well as risks. Barry et al. (1990,
p. 455) stated that the bpresence of multiple
venture capitalists allows the originating venture
capitalists to obtain independent assessments
about the likely success of the venture.QTable 4 Total assets and stated venture capital percenta
Total IPOs Biotechnolog
Number 190 78




owners intend to sell
30% 28%
Biotechnology
HealthcareAs illustrated in Table 3, in our study of 190 IPOs,
the typical IPO with venture capital investment
(102) had 2.6 venture capital firms invested in it
(range 1—7). The typical biotechnology firm with
venture capital investment had 2.8 (range 1—6)
firms invested in it, compared to the typical
healthcare firm with 2.5 firms invested (range 1—
7). There were 122 different venture capital firms
invested in the 102 IPOs.
When investing in IPOs, venture capitalists often
employ staged financing. Rather than provide all at
once the capital necessary to bring a new venture
to market, the venture capitalists instead bstageQ
their investment into distinct phases, with each
new phase allowing for a reassessment of the
partnerships, the environment, and the project as
a whole. Steier and Greenwood (1995) suggested
that staging is viewed as more effectively aligning
the goals of the entrepreneur with the goals of the
venture capitalist investor, thus reducing agency
costs. For investment purposes, venture capital
firms separate new ventures into distinct invest-
ment categories (e.g., early stage/seed, mezza-
nine stage, or late stage) based on size and stage of
development.
As illustrated in Table 4, of the 190 IPOs we
studied, the average total assets at the time of the
offering was $23 million. The typical biotechnology
firm had $21 million in total assets, compared to
$24 million for the typical healthcare firm. For IPOs
with venture capital involvement, total assets
averaged $22 million. For those not involving
venture capitalists, the number was $23 million.
Healthcare firms had slightly more total assets at
the time of the IPO than biotechnology firms. The
average biotechnology IPO with venture capital
investment had total assets of $20 million, com-
pared to $24 million in healthcare. The average
biotechnology firm without venture capital involve-
ment had total assets of $22 million at the time of
the IPO, compared to $24 million in healthcare.
As venture capitalists and entrepreneurs may
believe that the overall value of the firm will
increase, they may not wish to sell 100% of theirge equity pre- and post-IPO
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Structuring deals and governance after the IPO 309equity at the time of the IPO. Barry et al. (1990)
found that venture capitalists and non-venture
capitalists sell only 6.6% and 5.2%, respectively, of
their pre-IPO shares in the initial offering. Certo,
Daily, and Dalton (2001) noted that the retention of
ownership sends a strong signal to potential invest-
ors about the firm’s prospects.
The pre-IPO owners in our study stated that they
intended to sell 30% of the equity of the firm at the
time of the initial public offering (see Table 4).
Biotechnology firms planned to sell 28% and health-
care firms planned to sell 31%. The typical IPO with
venture capital involvement stated an intention to
sell 28% of its equity, while the typical IPO without
venture capital investment planned to sell 32%.
This trend was consistent across market segments,
with biotechnology firms with venture capital
investment stating the intention to sell 26%,
compared with 30% for biotechnology firms without
venture capital investment. The pre-IPO owners of
healthcare IPOs with venture capital investment
stated the intention to sell 29% of their equity,
compared to 33% for owners of healthcare IPOs
without venture capital investment. It should be
noted that these percentages are considerably
higher than those found in previous studies.
When investing in IPOs, venture capitalists also
employ the practice of specialization, including
specialization relating to industry, geographic lo-
cation, and stage in the venture’s life cycle
(Manigart et al., 2002). Barry et al. (1990) found
that venture capitalists tend to specialize to
provide expertise and increase their monitoring
ability. Norton (1995, pp. 21, 24) noted that
bspecialization can help reduce search costs and
agency costs of identifying and selecting attractive
venture capital investments. . . More so than in any
other current organizational form, the monitoring
function of venture capitalists and their ability to
function as expert consultants helps to increase
return potential, lower risk, and reduce agency
cost concerns.Q
Pratt’s Guide to Venture Capital Sources (1996)
surveys venture capital firms with respect to their
investment preferences. Nine categories are given,
including healthcare and biotechnology, from which
the venture capital firm may select investment
preferences. We considered a venture capital firm
to specialize if it limited its investment preferences
to the healthcare and biotechnology categories. Of
the 122 venture capital firms that invested in the
102 IPOs, only 18 limited their investing prefer-
ences to healthcare and/or biotechnology firms. In
addition, only 10 IPOs were considered to have
engaged specialist venture capital firms; that is,
the remaining eight firms either co-invested withother specialist firms or did not take the bleadQ role
(i.e., board seats and/or primary venture capital
investors).3. Implications for today and tomorrow
When bank loans have been exhausted and angels
have invested all they can afford, the entrepre-
neur frequently finds the only recourse for addi-
tional capital lies in selling shares in the business.
Many entrepreneurs would prefer to offer owner-
ship to the public while limiting the percentage of
shares sold to any particular person, so as to avoid
diluting their interest in the venture. As appealing
as this strategy might seem, it often does not pan
out; in fact, many entrepreneurs find it necessary
to sell relatively large blocks of stock to venture
capitalists.
Of the 190 biotechnology and healthcare ven-
tures we studied that went public during the
period 1996—1999, some of the IPOs had venture
capital investors; some did not. Therefore, we
were able to look at the effects of venture capital
involvement on selected governance matters in a
post-IPO environment. We were also able to
observe the ways the venture capitalists structured
their bdealsQ with this sample of entrepreneurial
start-ups.
First, we should note that the involvement of
venture capitalists increases the proportion of
outsiders on a firm’s board of directors, a boost of
approximately 15% according to our study. Since
the typical start-up usually has six members on the
board, this amounts to one additional outsider.
Moreover, the outsider is almost always a venture
capitalist who has invested in the firm; in fact, our
study shows that over 90% of the biotechnology and
healthcare firms placed venture capitalists on the
board as part of the IPO financing agreement.
Although there is no conclusive evidence to
suggest that the proportion of outsiders on the
board is associated with performance increases, a
higher ratio has generally been recognized as a
positive signal to investors and the Securities and
Exchange Commission. One undeniable effect of
venture capitalists’ representation on the board of
directors is that these individuals, because of their
perceived business acumen, become powerful
advocates in strategic decision making. This is
perhaps even more so the case in biotechnology
firms. Savvy business partners are often sorely
needed in high technology start-ups, in which
technical knowledge is significant but business
expertise can be lacking. The entrepreneur should
be aware that our findings suggest this venture
D.R. Williams et al.310capital expertise lies in the venture creation and
IPO process, and is not specific to an industry (i.e.,
very few venture capital firms were found to
specialize). Indeed, some would argue that, at
times, the influence of venture capitalists can shift
the strategic priorities of start-ups away from a
focus on building the long-term strengths of the
firm to short-term priorities, such as maximizing
earnings per share to boost stock prices and
ensuring that the company makes its quarterly
estimates.
We found no conclusive evidence that venture
capital involvement alone accounts for any differ-
ence in the percentage of firms retaining the
founder as an officer or member of the board.
However, this lack of conclusiveness was the result
of an important difference in biotechnology and
healthcare firms. Although the aggregate numbers
did not show any significant differences, 84% of the
biotechnology firms retained the founder as an
officer or board member when venture capitalists
were not involved; when venture capitalists were
investors, this figure dropped to 75%. Interestingly,
the opposite occurred in healthcare: 74% of the
founders remained as an officer or board member
when venture capitalists were not involved, but
this percentage increased to 84% with venture
capital investment. We cannot explain this differ-
ence, except to suggest the reason must be the
result of some industry-specific factor(s).
In all cases in both the biotechnology and
healthcare segments, the likelihood that a founder
would serve as the chair of the board, CEO, or
function in both positions was reduced with the
involvement of venture capitalists. While this does
not amount to purging the founders, it demon-
strates a clear preference on the part of venture
capitalists for reducing the concentration of exec-
utive power in the hands of owners and entrepre-
neurs as a condition for their participation. The
entrepreneur/craftsman who wishes to operate and
control his or her own business might find this to be
of great concern; however, it would be less
significant to the entrepreneur/opportunist whose
primary goal is new venture and personal wealth
creation. Interestingly, it would appear that a
Fortune 500 CEO might have more autonomy than
a founder-entrepreneur in these firms.
Finally, we found that, in our sample, between
two and three venture capital firms were involved
in most deals. This was interesting, since the
typical size of the firm in both biotechnology and
healthcare was relatively small. In terms of total
assets, the average IPO was under $25 million in
both industry segments. This was contrary to our
expectations. Moreover, we found that pre-IPOowners intended to sell a larger portion of their
equity in the deal than is generally typical.
Research indicates that most pre-IPO owners intend
to sell 11% of their equity, whereas our sample
percentage was closer to 30%. It is commonly
agreed that a more positive signal is generated
when pre-IPO investors intend to sell a smaller
percentage of their equity. These last two findings
may be indicative of the fact that this period
(1996—1999) was considered a bhot marketQ for
IPOs, and biotechnology and healthcare firms
(regardless of venture capital investment) may
have been pursuing the IPO to take advantage of
the influx of investor interest and capital in this
market. The business press’ report on the Internet
and software IPO markets appears to bear this
out.
Of course, there are limitations to our analysis.
Our examination is concentrated, with a focus on
190 firms in two industry segments. These segments
are likely to become even more important in the
future, as the healthcare sector in general is
expected to account for 17% of gross domestic
product within the next 5 years, and they continue
to attract venture capital investment. Although
one should be careful in generalizing our findings to
new ventures, we believe the results of our analysis
suggest important implications for governance and
financing issues. Specifically, entrepreneurs must
first understand their own needs and desires (and
how venture capitalists operate) prior to exploring
financing arrangements with venture capitalists.
Only by doing so will they enhance their potential
to receive financing and satisfy their personal and
professional goals.Appendix A. Context of the study and
method
We looked at two industry segments, biotechnology
and healthcare, to gain an understanding of the
role, activities, and goals of venture capitalists as
they relate to board and financing structures.
These industries were selected because the U.S.
healthcare sector is the nation’s second largest
market sector, with $1.8 trillion in expenditures in
2004 (National Coalition on Healthcare, 2004). In
2003, the healthcare sector accounted for 27% of
all venture capital investment.
We separated the healthcare market sector into
biotechnology firms and healthcare firms (e.g.,
medical devices, home health supply companies,
hospitals). We did this because biotechnology
firms, as a whole, typically have different financial
needs than other firms. It usually takes a biotech-
Structuring deals and governance after the IPO 311nology firm 8 to 10 years before it can bring a
product from conception to market; thus, they lack
revenue streams for longer periods than firms in
other industries. In addition, the average cost of
bringing a new drug to market is in excess of $800
million. Founding entrepreneurs in biotechnology
firms tend to be scientists, as opposed to the more
business-oriented backgrounds of healthcare entre-
preneurs. Finally, whereas there is a growing body
of literature on biotechnology IPOs, as illustrated
by Finkle (1998), Ginter and Duncan (2000, p. 58)
noted that the study of healthcare IPOs has drawn
little attention with b[t]he financial aspects of
business-level market entry strategies such
as. . .venture capital investment. . .[being] largely
ignored.Q Thus, we sought to determine if biotech-
nology and healthcare IPOs were experiencing the
same effects. We hoped that by focusing on these
two similar yet, in some respects, different indus-
try segments, we might gain broader insights into
IPOs, in general.
We identified biotechnology and healthcare IPOs
through several Internet sites (e.g., www.sec.gov,
www.edgar-online.com, www.iporesources.com,
www.ey.com, www. bio.org, www.biospace.com).
We found 216 biotechnology and healthcare firms
that filed an initial public offering registration
statement (e.g., S-1, SB-1, or SB-2 form) with the
SEC between January 1, 1996 and December 31,
1999. Of these 216 firms, 190 IPOs remained
registered and active with the SEC as separate
entities for 3 years. We limited our sample to these
190 firms.
The data related to our study were found in the
IPO’s prospectus that is part of initial registration
statements. We cross-referenced data related
to venture capital involvement with Pratt’s
Guide to Venture Capital Sources (1996) to ensure
that we accurately captured and reported these
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